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ARGUMENT 
I. 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
A. The Reckless Disregard Determination Inherently Requires a Comparison of 
Stacey's Conduct With That of Ludwig and Athay. 
When this lawsuit was initially filed, the Plaintiff alleged that three officers, Gregg Athay 
("Athay"), Chad Ludwig ("Ludwig") and Rich County Sheriff Dale Stacey ("Stacey"), caused or 
contributed to the Plaintiffs injuries based on their actions taken in participating in the pursuit. 
Under Idaho law, these officers were only liable to the Plaintiff if their actions amounted to 
"reckless disregard." I.C. § 49-623. Athay and Ludwig were dismissed from the suit after this 
Court determined that neither one of these officers acted with reckless disregard. The Court's 
analysis of these officers' actions is critical not only because it defines certain appropriate police 
conduct in the context of this pursuit, but also because it requires a comparison of Stacey's 
actions with those of Ludwig and Athay. 
In dismissing the Plaintiffs claims against Ludwig, this Court concluded that "there is 
absolutely nothing in the record showing that Deputy Ludwig operated his vehicle with reckless 
disregard for the safety of others or that his conduct induced Ervin to continue fleeing at a high 
rate of speed." Athay v. Stacey, 128 P.3d 897, 906-7 (Idaho 2005) ("Athay 1'). The conduct on 
the record included: 
1) The use of spike strips in an attempt to stop the Mustang, despite the fact that Ludwig 
did not know with certainty whether the vehicle he spiked was the fleeing vehicle until 
after the vehicle ran over the spikes I; 
I See Athay I at 907 ("[Ludwig] had not been given a description of the car he was to attempt to 
stop ... but correctly assumed it was the Mustang."). 
4 ApPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FOR RICH COUNTY, UTAH 
2) Ludwig's joining in the pursuit during its final eight miles; and 
3) Ludwig's involvement in the pursuit through Montpelier, including "fanning out," for 
greater visibility. 
Athay I at 907. 
In Athay II, this Court concluded that the following conduct did not show that Athay 
acted with reckless disregard: 
1) Dispatching Ludwig to attempt to stop the fleeing vehicle with spike strips; 
2) Joining the pursuit behind Stacey and remaining involved until the pursuit terminated; 
3) Requesting police traffic control assistance as the pursuit passed through Montpelier; 
4) Requesting that Caribou County attempt to stop the vehicle with spike strips. 
Athay v. Stacey, 196 P.3d 325,333-34 (Idaho 2008) CAthay 11'). 
As a result of this Court's holdings in Athay I and Athay II, Stacey could not be found to 
have acted with reckless disregard based upon his calling ahead to request assistance from other 
police agencies, requesting that Bear Lake County attempt to stop the Mustang using spike strips, 
fanning out for greater visibility through Montpelier, or continuing the final eight miles of the 
pursuit. Hence the Jury's determination necessarily relied upon a consideration of how and to 
what extent Stacey's actions differed from the appropriate actions of Ludwig and Athay. Only if 
the Plaintiff showed that Stacey acted differently and more "recklessly" than Ludwig and Athay 
could the Jury conclude that Stacey acted with reckless disregard and thereby find Rich County 
liable to the Plaintiff. 
2 Rich County raised this precise issue in the Jury Instruction Conference, asking that the Court 
instruct the Jury in accordance with this Court's prior holdings as to the conduct of Ludwig and 
Athay. The District Court declined Rich County's request. 
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B. The Plaintiff Did Not Introduce Any Evidence That Ervin Knew He Was Being 
Pursued. 
There is no question Stacey's conduct differed from that of Ludwig and Athay in one 
material way, that being Stacey's involvement in the pursuit prior to crossing into Idaho. Since 
the inception of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff s theory has been that Stacey (and the other officers) 
"initiated" and encouraged the pursuit by following the Mustang at high speeds through three 
states. In other words, the Plaintiff has argued that but for Stacey's continuing to follow the 
Mustang, the Mustang would have stopped or slowed down because there would be nothing to 
"flee" from. However, the Plaintiff did not introduce a single piece of evidence to show that 
Ervin knew that he was being pursued by law enforcement on June 10, 1999 and therefore failed 
to show that Stacey's conduct had any role in causing or contributing to the collision in question. 
On the evening of the collision, Idaho State Trooper W.D. Jones and Ludwig interviewed 
Ervin. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 62-63. In response to being informed that he was being charged with felony 
eluding, Ervin claimed that he did not know who he was eluding and had not seen any police 
officers that night. ld. at 63, L. 10-24. At trial, Ervin testified that he had no recollection of the 
pursuit or the collision itself. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 28, L. 10-18. There was simply no evidence to 
support the Plaintiff's assumption that Ervin knew Stacey was following him. 
C. The Plaintiff Failed To Prove All Elements of the Reckless Disregard Standard. 
In order to prove that Stacey acted with reckless disregard, the Plaintiff needed to 
introduce evidence to show: 1) Stacey's conduct created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm; 2) 
Stacey knew of the high degree of probability that the harm suffered by the Plaintiff would result 
from his conduct; and 3) Stacey continued his conduct despite his knowledge of the risk of harm. 
Athay II at 332; see also Harris v. State, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Idaho 1992). 
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First, there was no evidence introduced at trial to prove that Stacey's actions created an 
umeasonable risk of harm. Stacey attempted to stop a drunk driver based upon his erratic and 
dangerous driving patterns, and upon that driver fleeing pursued the fleeing felon. For whatever 
reason, the driver did not stop and continued to drive in a dangerous and reckless manner, 
endangering innocent motorists in three states. Stacey neither initiated the driver's dangerous 
behavior nor was there evidence that he increased the risk of harm to others. The jury could not 
have appropriately concluded that the first element of reckless disregard was proven. 
The Plaintiff argues that there were several facts showing that Stacey "knowing of the 
inherent dangers of [the] pursuit - chose to continue the chase." Respondent's Brief, p. 36. This 
statement significantly minimizes and misrepresents Stacey's testimony. While it is true that 
Stacey testified that he understood and appreciated that a police pursuit involves risks, as does 
any operation of a motor vehicle, he also testified extensively that he understood and appreciated 
the risk of letting an intoxicated motorist and reckless driver simply drive away. Stacey weighed 
the risk of these options, and determined that he would continue to follow the vehicle, but would 
radio to police agencies down the road, ahead of the drunk driver, so that these agencies could 
intercept the vehicle. Stacey never intended to pursue the vehicle through 3 states and there was 
no evidence or testimony that Stacey was trying to "catch up" to the Mustang and stop the driver 
himself. Stacey continued to radio ahead to other police agencies, fully expecting that the other 
law enforcement officers he knew worked in the area would be able to stop the Mustang. 
Unfortunately, it just so happened that every officer who would have ordinarily been able to help 
was busy that night or was unable to respond in time. 
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The evidence introduced at trial was not conclusive proof that Ervin's high-speed, out of 
control driving was the direct consequence of Stacey's decision to continue following Ervin.3 
The Plaintiff did not introduce any testimony or evidence from any officer or expert witness that 
called into question Stacey's decision to follow or continue following the Mustang. Contrary to 
the Plaintiff's statement that Stacey knew the Mustang's registered owner's address during the 
pursuit, all Stacey knew was that the Mustang was registered "to a Dora D. Gilgen or Billie Deen 
Ellett out of Soda Springs, Idaho." Defendant's Exh. 203, p. 1. This information would not have 
conclusively or directly led Stacey to the fleeing driver, particularly in light of the fact that 
Stacey did not know who the driver was or if the Mustang was stolen. 
D. The Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
The Plaintiff requests attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41, apparently 
based on his argument that Rich County's appeal "merely invites the court to second guess the 
findings of the lower court."4 Respondent's Brief, p. 13 (citing Crowley v. Critchfield, 181 P.3d 
435,440 (2007)). The only context in which the Plaintiff has alleged that Rich County has 
invited such "second-guessing" is its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
("JNOV"). Id., p. 33. 
3 The Plaintiff argued that Ervin's slowing down through Cokeville, Wyoming and then speeding 
back up again as he left Cokeville shows that he knew Stacey was behind him. Stacey testified 
that he was able to catch up to Ervin when he slowed through Cokeville, so the Plaintiff's theory 
was that at this point, Ervin sped up again. However, the testimony was that Ervin slowed down 
to around 45 miles per hour for the whole time he drove through Cokeville. Stacey did not testify 
that Ervin sped up as soon as he saw Stacey had caught up, but rather sped up when he left 
Cokeville and the speed limit increased. The evidence actually tends to show that Ervin only 
slowed in Cokeville to avoid being pulled over for speeding, not because he thought he had lost 
Stacey. 
4 The Plaintiff also states that "[a]ttorney's fees may ... be awarded under section 12-121 if the 
appeal is brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Id., p. 13. 
8 ApPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FOR RICH COUNTY, UTAH 
The Plaintiff has not submitted any argument to support his alleged entitlement to 
attorney's fees aside from pointing out the grounds for which attorney fees may be awarded 
under I.C. § 12-121. Absent any facts indicating that Rich County's JNOV, or any other part of 
this Appeal, was "brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation,,,5 the 
Plaintiff has failed to establish his entitlement to an award of fees and the Court should deny the 
Plaintiff s request. 
II. 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL (Ex Parte Contacts) 
A. The Plaintiff Waived All of His Procedural Objections to Rich County's First 
Motion for a New Trial. 
With respect to Rich County's Motion for a New Trial ("First Motion"), the issue on 
appeal is whether the District Court committed error in denying the First Motion, which this 
Court will review for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The question of whether a trial court 
abused its discretion is based on three inquiries, those being whether the trial court: 
"(1) recognize [ d] the issue as one of discretion, (2) act[ ed] within the boundaries of its 
discretion and applie[d] the applicable legal standards, and (3) reache[d] the decision 
through an exercise of reason." 
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (Idaho 1991). In other 
words, this Court's review for an abuse of discretion review is focused on wltat tlte district court 
did with tlte information it Itad before it. Therefore, only those facts and arguments that were 
before and considered by the district court should be considered on appeal. 
5 "When deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under I. C. § 12-121, the entire course 
of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, 
attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal 
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Michalk v. Michalk, 220 P.3d 
580,591 (Idaho 2009) (citing McGrew v. McGrew, 82 P.3d 833,844 (Idaho 2003)). Rich County 
has certainly presented numerous valid issues throughout the long history of this litigation, and 
therefore the Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees. 
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The District Court, on its own initiative, denied the First Motion based on Rich County's 
"failure to support the motion with an affidavit," as required by I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1). In opposing 
the First Motion, the only arguments advanced by the Plaintiff in both his briefs or during oral 
argument were substantive arguments about the whether the ex parte communications had any 
impact on the jury. "The rule is well settled that a party cannot avail himself of a defense for the 
first time in the appellate court, nor will a question not raised in the trial court be considered on 
appeal." Webster v. Potlach Forests, 187 P.2d 1, 17 (Idaho 1947) (quoting Grant v. St. James 
Mining Co., Ltd., 191 P. 359,359 (Idaho 1920)). 
The Plaintiff did not, in any way, object to the fact that Rich County did not file an 
affidavit with its First Motion nor did he contend that Rich County's alleged knowledge of the ex 
parte contacts effectively barred Rich County from asserting these contacts as grounds for a new 
trial. Moreover, the Court itself never mentioned Rich County's alleged "knowledge" in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order and did not inquire about it during the November 18,2010 
Hearing on the First Motion. Therefore the Plaintiff cannot now argue that the lack of an 
affidavit was prejudicial or that Rich County waived its objections to the ex parte 
communications and the Court should not consider these arguments. 
B. The Plaintiff Was Not Prejudiced by the Fact That Rich County Did Not File an 
Affidavit. 
The Plaintiff's argument that he was unaware of the specific facts Rich County would 
assert as grounds for its First Motion defies logic and is without merit. Rich County's 
Memorandum in Support of its First Motion, filed along with the First Motion, clearly explains 
that the First Motion is exclusively based on the ex parte communications that the Court 
disclosed during the September 16, 2010 Status Conference. Rich County further explained: 
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"Defendant has no idea the subject or subjects of the conversations, no idea how many 
text messages were sent and no idea if it was on a single date, over a span of days or 
weeks." 
R. Vol. 2, p. 317. 
The facts upon which Rich County's Motion was based were obvious to the Court and 
the Plaintiff. It is clear from the Supporting Memorandum that Rich County had no knowledge or 
information beyond that disclosed by the Court during the Status Conference. In fact, Rich 
County requested in the alternative that the Court order production of all of the ex parte 
communications. There is simply no "suggestion" or indication that Rich County would assert 
other facts as grounds for its First Motion. 
The Plaintiffs conduct was the subject of the September 16,2011 Status Conference and 
certainly he had and has the greatest knowledge of anyone besides Peck as to the nature and 
extent of his improper ex parte communications. In fact, most the "details" of the ex parte 
contact that were argued by Rich County actually came from the Plaintiffs Affidavit provided in 
response to the First Motion. The Plaintiff cannot say, in good faith, that Rich County knew 
more than he did about his own conduct and was in no way prejudiced or disadvantaged by the 
lack of an affidavit "stating in detail the facts relied upon." 
C. Rich County Had No Knowledge of the Ex Parte Communications. 
The Plaintiff incorrectly states that during the September 16, 2010 Status Conference, 
Rich County's counsel informed the Court that "they had been was aware of contact between 
[Brandy Peck ("Peck")] and [the Plaintiff], but chose not to report it." Respondent's Brief, p. 19. 
In actuality Rich County's counsel, Blake Hamilton6, stated "We did have some concerns about 
6 Mr. Hamilton was not present during the trial with the exception of closing arguments and was 
handling the telephonic status conference because Rich County's trial counsel was trying a 
Federal criminal case in the Southern District of Florida at the time. 
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the communication between Brandy [Peck] and the Plaintiff during the trial." Tr. Telephone 
Conf., p. 5, L. 5-6 (emphasis added). Mr. Hamilton further clarified, "[a]s I recall the 
conversations about the concerns that we had, I believe that they were at the beginning of the 
trial and ... [w]e didn't notice any further continuance of those conversations. I believe that is 
why it wasn't brought up then." Id. at 6-7. 
Mr. Hamilton never stated that Rich County's counsel knew that the Plaintiff and Peck 
were communicating several times a day, both during and after the trial day, or sending hundreds 
of text messages over the course of the trial because Rich County's counsel did not know any of 
those things were happening. Mr. Hamilton accurately reported that Rich County had some 
general concerns stemming from Peck's courtroom demeanor and counsel's observing Peck in 
the hallway with the Plaintiff outside the courtroom during a recess. These observations did not 
conclusively indicate that Peck and the Plaintiff were having some inappropriate contact much 
less a full-blown personal relationship as was actually the case. Rich County's concerns were 
just that - concerns, not actual knowledge of the ex parte communications at issue. The 
Plaintiff's suggestion is absolutely incorrect and thus his argument, even if it is not waived, is 
entirely lacking in merit. 
D. Rueth's Burden-Shifting Analysis Applies to the Rich County's First Motion. 
The issue raised in Rich County's First Motion is whether the Plaintiff's misconduct, that 
is, his ex parte communications with the District Court's deputy clerk, prevented Rich County 
from having a fair trial. In Slaathaug, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial after they learned that 
the defendant insurance company provided daily trial transcripts to defense witnesses in violation 
of the exclusionary rule. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 979 P.2d 107 (Idaho 1999). The Court 
held that "where a motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) is based upon misconduct, the 
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moving party has only the burden to establish that the misconduct occurred. The party opposing 
the motion must then establish that the conduct could not have affected the outcome of the trial." 
Id., at 112 (citing Hinman v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 771 P.2d 533 (Idaho 1989); Rueth v. State, 
596 P.2d 75,80 (Idaho 1979» (emphasis added). 
The Court explained "[i]n Idaho, it is definitely not the case that the losing party has the 
double burden of showing both that a ... violation has and that 'actual prejudice' has resulted." 
Jd.; (quoting Rueth, 596 P.2d at 80) (emphasis in original). This approach, the Court reasoned, 
makes particular sense in a case where the non-moving party's misconduct is at issue because 
s/he is in the "best position to present evidence of prejudice or lack thereof." Jd., at 113. 
Accordingly, once the Slaathaugs established that the insurance company had provided 
transcripts in violation of the exclusionary rule, the burden shifted to the insurance company to 
show the content of the transcripts provided and that the violation could not have had any effect 
on the verdict. Jd. 
The facts of Slaathaug are analogous to the instant case. Rich County's First Motion 
alleges that the Plaintiff engaged in misconduct by engaging in extensive ex parte 
communication and contact with Peck. The District Court, as well as the Plaintiff, admits that 
this behavior was improper and should never have occurred. Therefore, Rich County has met its 
burden under the first prong of the Rueth analysis. It is then the Plaintiff's burden to show both 
the content of these communications and that the misconduct could not have affected the trial's 
outcome. 
Just as the insurance company in Slaathaug was in the best position to explain the details 
of their misconduct, the Plaintiff is one of only two people who actually knows and can explain 
the substance of his ex parte communications with Peck. No one was present during the ex parte 
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contacts except for the Plaintiff and Peck. Even the Court was unaware as to the precise details 
of these conversations because it received its information second-hand, by overhearing a 
discussion between court staff members in chambers. It is only logical that the Plaintiff here 
must bear the burden of showing what those communications were. 
Moreover, as the party that engaged in the misconduct, the Plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that the communications could not have had any effect on the jury. The District Court 
erroneously based its substantive determination on Rich County's failure to affirmatively prove 
that the ex parte communication caused prejudice or improper jury influence, but this is not what 
the Rueth standard requires. Instead, the Plaintiff must show that his misconduct could not have 
had any impact on the jury and/or prevented Rich County from having a fair trial. See Slaathaug, 
979 P.2d at 112 (emphasis added). 
E. The Plaintiff Failed to Show that the Communication Could Not Have Affected the 
Trial's Outcome. 
The District Court abused its discretion when it concluded that the ex parte 
communications did not affect the trial's integrity or prevent either party from having a fair trial 
because the Plaintiff failed to meet the minimum showings under Rueth's four-prong analysis. 
The Plaintiff did not sufficiently demonstrate the content of the ex parte communications such 
that the District Court could even begin to determine their potential prejudicial impact. The 
information that the Plaintiff did disclose regarding the communications suggests that these 
improper communications very likely may have denied Rich County a fair trial. 
For example, the Plaintiff and Peck testified that they did not remember the specifics of 
their communications, but the only specific conversations that either of them could recall was 
once where Peck asked the Plaintiff about how he felt the trial was going, and once where the 
Plaintiff mentioned to Peck that he was "frustrated" with the trial and was happy to have Peck's 
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"smiling face." Tr. Hr'g, November 18, 2010, p. 36-37 & 41. There is no question that the 
Plaintiff and Peck discussed the trial on at least two occasions and this totally inappropriate 
exchange of information between the Plaintiff and a member of the Court's staff could very well 
have made its way to the Jury7. 
In Slaathaug, the trial court first considered the possible methods for cunng the 
defendant's misconduct8 but concluded that all of these methods were no longer available 
because the misconduct was only revealed after trial. The trial court granted the Slaathaugs' 
motion for a new trial for two reasons. First, "[t]he prejudice to the plaintiff is difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure because there is no way of knowing what the testimony would have been 
had the violation not occurred," and thus a new trial is a more suitable remedy than those that 
would have been available during trial. Id. Also, "[o]rdering a new trial...serves as a deterrent 
"to discourage future violations .... " !d. 
Rich County and Plaintiffs counsel only became aware of Plaintiffs and the trial court's 
staff s improper conduct after the trial. The District Court had the opportunity to make Rich 
County and the Plaintiff s counsel aware of the situation during the trial, but for whatever reason 
chose not to. This was the District Court's first abuse of discretion, because in failing to disclose 
the inappropriate conduct and allowing the parties to voice their objection when something could 
have feasibly been done to correct the situation, the District Court effectively denied Rich 
County a fair trial. 
7 The juror affidavits referred to in Respondent's Brief were stricken by the Court and are not 
part of the Clerk's Record for this Appeal. These affidavits are therefore irrelevant and it was 
improper for the Plaintiff to mention them in his Brief. 
8 The remedies listed by the trial court were: 1) citing the violating witness for contempt, 2) 
permitting the injured party to comment on the violation, 3) refusing to let the violating witness 
testify, and 4) striking the violating witness' testimony. Id., at 112. 
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The District Court also abused its discretion in determining, without any evidence to 
support such a conclusion, that the misconduct was only "harmless error." Much like the 
situation in Slaathaug, there is no way of knowing whether or to what extent the Plaintiff's 
inappropriate relationship with Peck was known by jury or influenced the ultimate result of the 
trial and thus Rich County should have been granted a new trial under the Rueth analysis. 
Moreover, the District Court's decision does nothing to deter future misconduct on the part of 
parties or its own court staff. Judge Brown acknowledged that Peck was not truthful to him 
during the trial when she told him that she had ended the ex parte contacts with the Plaintiff. 
Obviously Judge Brown's admonitions alone were pitifully insufficient to stop her improper 
behavior. At this point, the Plaintiff has essentially gotten away with breaking what should have 
been an obvious rule, that being to refrain from personal, ex parte communications and a 
relationship with the trial court. This Court should not allow such behavior in Idaho's district 
courts, particularly to the very likely detriment of innocent parties. 
III. 
Motion to Strike Rich County's Second Motion for New Trial 
A. The District Court's Reading of the Kuhn Decision is Material to Rich County's 
Appeal. 
With respect to Rich County's Motion for New Triae ("Second Motion"), the issue on 
appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Rich 
County's Motion for New Trial based upon its reliance on Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, 
245 P.3d 992 (Idaho 2010). The District Court's decision was expressly and solely based its 
9 This Motion, as filed, is entitled "Rich County's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict." Although these two issues were raised in a single 
motion, Section III of Appellant's Reply Brief only pertains to the first part, that being the 
Motion for New Trial. 
16 ApPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FOR RICH COUNTY, UTAH 
determination that Kuhn overruled the Court's holding in Nations, (Nations v. Bonner Bldg. 
Supply, 746 P.2d 1027 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987», which was actually cited by the Plaintiff in 
support of his position that Rich County's Motion should be stricken. The District Court 
explained: 
"[I]fthe analysis were complete with the Court's reading and interpretation of Nations, 
the Court would conclude that it was within the Court's discretion to determine whether 
or not to dismiss the motion for new trial or strike the same as requested by Athay. The 
Court would also refuse Athay's request to strike based upon the logic and holding in 
Nation[s 1." 
R., p. 507 (emphasis added). 
The Plaintiff agrees that the District Court was incorrect in concluding that Kuhn 
overruled Nations. Respondent's Brief, pp. 27-32. Absent the District Court's erroneous 
conclusion that Kuhn overruled Nations, it would not have granted the Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike and would have considered the merits of Rich County's Second Motion. An erroneous 
conclusion of law is not a matter of discretion. Therefore, this Court should reverse the District 
Court's decision on the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and remand for consideration of the Second 
Motion's substantive arguments. 
B. The District Court Would Not Have Abused its Discretion if it had Denied the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. 
Rich County does not contend that the particularity requirement does not apply to 
motions for a new trial made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) or (7). Instead, the issue is whether the 
particularity requirement must be satisfied within the time period set forth in I.R.C.P. 59(b). As 
the District Court explained, Nations states that there is nothing in Rule 59 or in the case law that 
requires that the particular grounds supporting a motion for a new trial be set forth in the motion 
itself or within the 14-day time period in Rule 59(b). The Plaintiff has not cited a single case or 
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advanced any convincing argument to the contrary, nor does the Plaintiff contend that Kuhn or 
any other subsequent case overruled Nations. 
There is no question that Rich County did, in fact, satisfy Rule 59's particularity 
requirement in its Memorandum in Support of the Second Motion, which was filed within the 
time limits set forth in I.R.C.P. 7. The District Court accepted Rich County's Memorandum and 
heard oral argument on the Motion. The Plaintiff was provided the requisite opportunity to 
review the Memorandum, prepare a response, and argue his Opposition. Therefore, it would have 
been appropriate for the District Court, in its discretion, to deny the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 
and consider Rich County's substantive arguments advanced in its second Motion as it stated it 
would have but for its incorrect interpretation of Kuhn. Since the parties agree that Kuhn did not 
overrule Nations, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision to strike the Second 
Motion and remand for consideration of its substantive issues. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those reasons contained in Appellant 's Brieffor Rich 
County, Utah, Appellant Rich County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District 
Court's decisions as to Rich County's Motion to Disqualify and First Motion for a New Trial. 
The facts indicate that the District Court's decisions were based upon biased analysis of 
procedural issues and were clearly an abuse of its discretion. Appellant further respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decisions striking Rich County's Second 
Motion for a New Trial because the parties agree that this decision was solely based on an 
erroneous legal conclusion. Finally, since there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to 
support the Jury's finding that Stacey acted with reckless disregard, this Court should reverse the 
District Court's denial of Rich County's Alternative Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
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Verdict. Accordingly, this court should correct the errors in the record and set aside the verdict 
and order a new trial. 
DATED this 2"3 day of November, 2011. 
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOHNSTON 
By: 
ALAN JOHNSTON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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